Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain

This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation.Electricity, liberalisation, regulation, benchmarking

Relative Performance of UK and Japanese Electricity Distribution Systems 1985-1998: Lessons for Incentive Regulation

International comparisons can be used to study relative efficiency of decision-making units in an industry in a wider context. In particular, cross-country comparisons can, help regulators of natural monopoly firms to assess the relative performance of their regulation regime and national firms with those of other countries. The relative performance of frontier firms is important as these may be subject to lax regulation and could constitute benchmarks for regulation of other firms. The results of empirical studies can be sensitive to the choice of techniques and models. The UK and Japanese electricity distribution utilities have been subject to yardstick regulation since 1990 and 1996 respectively. In this paper we present an analysis of the development and relative performance of electricity distribution utilities in the UK and Japan between 1985 and 1998. The results allow the examination of the impact of privatisation and regulation on the UK firms and their scope for further efficiency gains. The paper presents the findings from applying input distance functions with data envelopment analysis (DEA), stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), and corrected ordinary least square (COLS) techniques using cost based model specifications in a dynamic setting.Technical Efficiency, Efficiency Analysis, Electricity Distribution Systems, Incentive Regulation, International Comparison

Productivity and Efficiency of US Gas Transmission Companies: A European Regulatory Perspective

Keywords JEL Classification On both sides of the Atlantic the regulation of gas transmission networks has undergone major changes since the early 1990’s. Whereas in the US the long-standing regime of cost-plus regulation was complemented by increasing pipe-to-pipe competition, most European countries moved towards incentive regulation complemented by market integration. We study the impact of US regulatory reform using a Malmquist-based productivity analysis for a panel of US interstate companies. Results are presented for changes in productivity, as well as for several convergence tests. The results indicate that taking productivity and convergence as performance indicators, regulation has been rather successful, in particular during a period where overall demand was flat. Lessons for European regulators are twofold. First, the US analysis shows that benchmarking of European transmission operators would be possible if data were available. Second, our results suggest that, in the long-run, market integration and competition are alternatives to the current European model. Natural gas transmission; utility regulation; data envelopment analysis; total factor productivity; convergenc

Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution

Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.efficiency, quality of service, scale economies, input distance function, stochastic frontier analysis

'Core Indicators for Determinants and Performance of Electricity Sector in Developing Countries’

Since the early 1990s, substantial resources and effort have been spent on implementing market-oriented electricity reform in developing countries. Important sectoral, economic, and social dimensions are involved in electricity reform, but empirical analysis and evaluation have been of limited use for testing the economic rationale of reform and policy advice. This may partly be attributed to a lack of generally accepted and measured indicators for monitoring progress, impact and performance, unlike areas such as health, education, environment, sustainable development. In this paper we propose a set of indicators as a first step towards filling this gap and developing a coherent framework for studying electricity reform in developing countries covering resource and institutional endowments, key reform steps, market structure, performance, and various impacts.Electricity, Reform, developing countries

Benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution utilities

Quality of service has emerged as an important issue in post-reform regulation of electricity distribution networks. Regulators have employed partial incentive schemes to promote cost saving, investment efficiency, and service quality. This paper presents a quality-incorporated benchmarking study of the electricity distribution utilities in the UK between 1991/92 and 1998/99. We calculate technical efficiency of the utilities using Data Envelopment Analysis technique and productivity change over time using quality-incorporated Malmquist indices. We find that cost efficient firms do not necessarily exhibit high service quality and that efficiency scores of cost-only models do not show high correlation with those of quality-based models. The results also show that improvements in service quality have made a significant contribution to the sector’s total productivity change. In addition, we show that integrating quality of service in regulatory benchmarking is preferable to cost-only approaches.quality of service, benchmarking, incentive regulation, data envelopment analysis, electricity

Reform and Regulation of the Electricity Sectors in Developing Countries

The 1990s witnessed a worldwide trend toward electricity sector reforms in developed and developing economies. These reforms have generally been based on private participation, regulatory reform, and competition in the sector. This paper reviews and draws lessons from the reform experience in developing countries. Developing countries have had to reform technically and financially less efficient electricity systems with less developed private sectors, weak economic and political institutions, shortage of skilled human resources, and lack of regulatory experience. The paper argues that competition and regulatory reform are equally important to the success of reforms. Also, the sector’s systemic characteristics and the country’s institutional endowment should weight equally in the design of reforms. In addition, distributional and access to service aspects of reforms call for a redefined state involvement rather than a complete withdrawal from the sector.Electricity, Reform, Regulation